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COMPENSATION RIGHTS FOR REDUCTION IN 
PROPERTY VALUES DUE TO PLANNING 
DECISIONS: THE CASE OF FRANCE 
VINCENT A. RENARD∗ 
Compensation for reduction in property values due to planning 
decisions is an old question in many countries. At the same time, this 
question is deeply rooted in the contents of property rights, the practice of 
physical planning, and the implementation of other regulations. 
As opposed to the theory and practice of “takings” developed in the 
United States, the land-use system in France is built on the opposite 
principle: no compensation has to be paid for the restriction of 
development rights resulting from urban regulations.1 
This basic principle was introduced as early as 1935, and debates about 
town and country planning still refer to it to this day. The lack of 
economic equity resulting from this principle of non-compensation and the 
resistance it evokes among landowners have led to some bypasses and 
criticism. The principle of non-compensation is also related to the parallel 
concept of betterment recoupment in that there is no betterment tax in 
France. 
This Article will describe the origins of the basic principle of non-
compensation, the limits of its application, and the various ways in which 
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landowners can receive limited compensation. The Article will conclude 
by commenting on the recent evolution of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ jurisprudence. 
I. ZONING DURING THE 1930S: THE REVOLT OF LANDOWNERS AGAINST 
ZONING 
The issue of zoning was raised for the first time in France in the early 
1930s when the Préfet of the Paris Region, M Prost, launched the first 
master plan of the Paris Region, which has come to be known as Plan 
Prost. 
The first zoning plan (plan d’occupation de sol) was introduced in 
1932, and it attracted strong opposition from several major landowners, 
who owned large pieces of land in the suburbs. These landowners were 
accustomed to subdividing in a rather primitive way, which gave rise to 
the expression lotissements défectueux, or “inadequate subdivisions.” No 
specific permit was required at that time. 
The very idea of zoning, of limiting or even canceling any development 
rights on a piece of land, generated strong political opposition that led to 
the adoption of new legislation. This legislation was a décret-loi, meaning 
that it was an executive decree rather than parliamentary legislation. It 
stated that no compensation should be paid for restrictions or even for total 
denials of development rights under the Urban Code (Code de l’ 
Urbanisme), a cumulative set of laws and regulations about land use and 
development. Initially, this legislation was only intended to apply to the 
Paris Region. However, the tough legislative measures were not 
immediately applied to Plan Prost due to the lengthy developmental 
process of the master plan. Eventually, the master plan was approved in 
1939 after other issues of higher priority had been addressed. 
After World War II, the principle of non-compensation remained in 
effect. It was extended to the whole country in 1943 and was later codified 
and officially enshrined into French law. At the time, the expansion of this 
principle was seen, in part, as a necessary measure to address the 
extremely urgent problem of rebuilding a country torn by war as well as a 
means to overcome the inertia and resistance of landowners. 
The principle of non-compensation became a pillar of town and 
country planning in France. It was later codified in article L 160-5 of the 
Urban Code: “No compensation will be paid for zoning restrictions 
introduced by the Code, in particular . . . restrictions to land use, 
development rights, height of buildings, etc.” However, the article also 
articulated two “general exceptions” to the principle of non-compensation: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/5
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“[A] compensation is due if these restrictions result in a decrease in vested 
rights (droits acquis) or a modification of the previous state of the area 
resulting in a damage which is direct, material and certain.” 
These two general exceptions have been narrowly interpreted by the 
courts. However, the economic impact on landowners has been mitigated 
somewhat by the progressive flexibility in the implementation of zoning 
coupled with a series of subject-specific exceptions to the principle of non-
compensation. We now turn to the exploration of the two general 
exceptions. 
II. THE GENERAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF NON-
COMPENSATION 
The first general exception to the principle of non-compensation 
pertains to “restrictions on vested rights.” This general exception, 
however, has been interpreted by the courts in a narrow way. Courts have 
consistently held that landowners do not have vested rights to develop 
their land as long as building permits have not been granted. In principle, 
downzoning does not constitute a restriction on a vested right, which 
means that a local plan, the French equivalent to zoning in the United 
States, does not grant a landowner a vested right to develop. Thus, a local 
plan’s revision or abolishment does not result in compensation to the 
landowner. However, once a building permit is granted, a cancellation of 
this permit stemming from a new regulation is considered a restriction on 
a vested right and affords the landowner the possibility of claiming 
compensation. 
In a March 4, 1977 decision, the Supreme Administrative Court 
(Conseil d'Etat) expanded the notion of vested rights. In that case, a 
developer had originally been granted a “subdivision permit,” which only 
authorized him to subdivide and service the land. Afterward, the area 
encompassed by the subdivision permit was subjected to some restrictive 
regulations. The court concluded that a mere subdivision permit did create 
a vested right, and the developer was compensated for some of the work 
he had done. 
More recently, in 1998, the Conseil d’Etat introduced a broader 
exception in the Bitouzet case.2 The Court stated that compensation is due 
if the zoning restriction can be considered “abnormal and extraordinary” 
(special et exorbitant). Although at first glance, this appears to be a major 
 
 
 2. Conseil d’Etat Section [CE Sect.] [highest administrative court section] July 3, 1998, 
Ministère de l’ Equipement c/ Bitouzet. 
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precedent that modifies the principle of non-compensation, the language of 
the decision suggests that its effect on the principle of non-compensation 
is very minor . Indeed, this case has not had much impact in practice.  
Another situation where the courts have recognized compensation 
rights is when a landowner has suffered intention dolosive, or “intentional 
injury.” This can be claimed by a landowner when a public authority, 
usually a municipality, severely restricts the development rights granted 
by the local plan and then expropriates the land at a price lower than the 
market price due to the downzoning. This claim is rarely used in practice; 
however, it does deter municipalities that may be attracted to the idea. 
The second general exception to the principle of non-compensation, a 
modification in the state of the property resulting in some direct, material, 
and certain damage, has been used more frequently. However, like the first 
general exception, the second general exception does not significantly 
weaken the basic principle of non-compensation. Indeed, zoning and 
rezoning are not regarded by themselves as modifications of the state of 
the property, the rationale being that a change or revision of a regulation 
does not modify the character or nature of property. Any modification is 
regarded only as an indirect consequence and thus does not result in a right 
to compensation.  
In summary, the fundamental principle of no compensation for zoning 
restrictions, a principle first introduced in 1935, today encompasses the 
entire country. The codified general exceptions to this principle have 
proven to be relatively insignificant as interpreted by the courts. However, 
the potential economic hardships to landowners under this principle have 
been assuaged to a large extent by an increasing flexibility in the 
application of local planning and by a series of specific exceptions that 
apply to a variety of practical situations. At the same time, European 
Union legislation and jurisprudence are progressively evolving and 
leaning toward the protection of landowners rather than enforcing the non-
compensation principle.3 
III. THE CONTEXT OF A DECENTRALIZED PLANNING SYSTEM AFTER THE 
1980S AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE QUESTION OF  
“WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS” 
Up to 1980, the planning framework in France was highly centralized. 
The national government was directly responsible for preparing structure 
 
 
 3. See discussion infra Part VII. 
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and local plans as well as approving building permits. This changed 
radically in the 1980s due to two developments: (1) the decentralization of 
planning powers starting in 1981, and (2) the international trend toward 
deregulation that was spreading across countries during the 1980s. 
Decentralization has generally resulted in an increase in the flexibility of 
zoning, which in turn has opened the doors to more negotiations in the 
development process and in compensation. In fact, negotiations between 
developers and municipalities can now almost be considered an integral 
part of the planning and development process. 
As part of the decentralization reforms, municipalities in the 1980s 
became responsible for planning and zoning, as well as approving building 
permits once local plans were approved. Although the legal format and 
content of structure plans, local plans, and development rights were 
essentially unaltered during the period of decentralization, local authorities 
in practice exercised greater discretion and flexibility primarily through 
the use of the “modification” procedure, but also through the occasional 
use of the “revision” procedure.  
The modification procedure can be adapted to slight ad hoc changes, 
such as those for a single lot or development project. It has the advantage 
of being simpler and quicker than the revision procedure, and it can be 
used as long as it does not change the “general equilibrium” of the local 
plan (l’économie générale du POS). In contrast to a “revision,” which is 
similar to an initial elaboration of a new plan, the “modification” process 
generally does not require the involvement of other public bodies, like the 
neighboring municipalities, in order to prepare the plan. 
To a large extent, decentralization has changed the relationship 
between zoning, land prices, and impact fees. Over the years, the increased 
flexibility of zoning has gradually spread throughout France. This 
flexibility has had an impact on land values by bringing zoning decisions 
closer to market valuations, thereby limiting the claims for compensation. 
It has opened the way for more negotiations over impact fees, which have 
greatly increased during France’s boom cycles. The higher flexibility can, 
in one sense, be thought of as a compensation mechanism: it grants 
development rights in a flexible way to mitigate inequities raised by 
zoning. 
Given that there are over 36,000 French municipalities, decentralization 
of the planning powers at the municipality level has made it difficult for 
the State to control local practices. One consequence has been the extent 
of the financial relationships between developers, builders, and local 
authorities, which has grown to an unprecedented level. In some instances, 
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these relationships have led to corruption, most notably during the boom 
period from 1985 to 1990. 
IV. AN AMBIGUOUS DEVICE: TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, THE 
FRENCH WAY 
As indicated, French urban development law, like that of several 
Western European legal systems, is based on the principle of no 
compensation for urban development constraints. In the terminology used 
in North America, the “police power” takes over from “eminent domain.” 
In spite of what has been said before, the principle of non-compensation at 
times does create inequities for landowners whose land is differently 
affected by urban regulations. 
In France, such inequities posed a particularly thorny problem in the 
early 1970s with the passage of the Land Use Act (Loi d’Orientation 
Foncière) of December 31, 1967, which added more urban planning and 
zoning measures that further constrained landowners. The Land Use Act 
was a landmark in French urban law because it introduced zoning-like 
land-use plans (Plan d’Occupation des Sols) for the first time as a general 
principle with no exemptions.  
The controversy surrounding zoning lasted for many years. After a 
number of abortive attempts, Parliament passed the Urban Development 
Reform Act (Loi sur la réforme de l’urbanisme) of December 31, 1976, 
which finally made it possible in some zones for development rights to be 
transferred from a “transmitter” subzone to a “receiver” subzone. In 
French, this mechanism is called transfert de coefficient d’ occupation des 
sols (“TDR”). This principle is presently embodied in article L 123-2 of 
the Urban Development Code: 
In zones to be conserved because of the quality of the landscape . . . 
land-use plans may determine the conditions under which the 
development potential determined by the land-use coefficient set for 
the zone as a whole may, subject to authorization by the 
administrative authorities, be transferred in order to promote 
concentration of development on other lots in one or more sectors of 
the same zone. 
The language referring to zones that are “to be conserved because of 
the quality of the landscape” is somewhat ambiguous. One issue arising 
from this ambiguity is whether the intent is to exclude productive 
agricultural areas as well as zones available for development. This 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/5
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distinction may not be possible to make because, as of right now, there is 
no case law on this point. 
The very definition of the transfer mechanism illustrates the tension 
inherent in this concept. On the one hand, it appears to be an efficient 
market mechanism to allocate development rights among landowners, but 
on the other hand, it also functions as a compensation mechanism when 
development rights for land have been severely restricted. 
The transfer provision has generated a great deal of debate with 
criticism concentrating on three main points: (1) the transfer provision’s 
apparent tie to zoning, (2) the incompatibility of the transfer provision 
with the principle of non-compensation for zoning restrictions, and (3) the 
inequities that result if viewed from the perspective of distributive justice. 
The first point of contention with the transfer provision stems from the 
interpretation of the phrase “quality of the landscape” that seems to equate 
it with a conservancy area, in which all development is prohibited. Given 
this interpretation, critics question why productive agricultural areas, 
which often constitute landscape of high quality, can be excluded from the 
transfer mechanism. 
Agricultural landowners may be greatly tempted to apply for 
transferable development rights. The ambiguous relationship between the 
transfer provision and zoning has had an adverse impact on the initial 
attempts to apply the transfer provision in France, the two leading 
examples occurring in Lourmarin (Vaucluse) and La Cadière d’ Azur 
(Var).  
Lourmarin was a typically quaint village in the south of France. As 
country farmers found it more and more difficult to earn a comfortable 
living, there was strong pressure for the development of single-family 
summer houses in the country, which would have quickly led to urban 
sprawl. A group of new Lourmarin residents attempted to use TDR to limit 
further development and maintain their property values. They urged 
governmental authorities to compensate the farmers through the use of 
TDR. The transfer was unsuccessful, however, due in part to poor timing. 
It occurred at a time when municipalities and the national government 
were vying for influence and power. Decentralization had not yet been 
implemented. At this juncture when municipalities could only apply TDR 
if the national government approved, the transfer mechanism could not be 
fully developed and refined.  
Another attempt at applying TDR took place in La Cadière d’ Azur, a 
village on the French Riviera. In contrast to the land of Lourmarin, most of 
the land in La Cadière d’ Azur consisted of economically viable vineyards. 
Landowners, who were still engaged in farming, became frustrated by 
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their inability to reap the benefits of development pressure. They tried to 
use TDR as a remedy; however, their attempt was unsuccessful for the 
same timing reasons that plagued the residents of Lourmarin. Neither of 
these cases reached the courts.  
Critics of the transfer mechanism have also challenged the view that a 
transfer of a development right is justified because it is a form of 
compensation for a restrictive regulation. The critics argue that protecting 
an area that should be “conserved because of the quality of the landscape” 
is clearly in the public interest. The transfer of rights as a form of 
compensation, it is argued, contradicts the principle that land-use 
regulation is not compensable. 
A third criticism of the transfer mechanism is grounded in the notion of 
distributive justice. It is argued that the equity of TDR depends on the 
original distribution of land holdings. When land is initially shared in a 
fairly equitable way among households, the TDR procedure is more or less 
neutral in terms of distributive justice. However in reality, land ownership 
is not distributed in an equal manner among households, and under these 
circumstances, TDR may exacerbate this inequality. The transfer 
mechanism represents a transfer of a benefit from the community as a 
whole, which is the legitimate beneficiary of any value added by urban 
development, to a particular subgroup represented by the landowners in 
the zone concerned. This argument is primarily philosophical in nature and 
difficult to articulate as a legal argument. Thus far, no case that has 
reached the courts has used this argument, but in practice this third 
criticism has made acceptance of TDR problematic.  
At the present time, TDR has been minimally used as a substitute for 
compensation. The continuing robustness of the principle of non-
compensation and the legal complexity of the transfer mechanism entails a 
high risk of litigation for a would-be transferor. Hence, TDR is seen as a 
tool that is best avoided if other avenues to compensation are available. 
We now move on to explore these avenues.  
V. COMPENSATION THROUGH THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION PRINCIPLE 
A landowner whose property suffers a large decline in value due to a 
zoning decision may be able to impose on the responsible government 
authority an obligation to buy the property under the principle of inverse 
condemnation (droit de délaissement). In France, this practice is widely 
used for several types of regulations.  
One of its most important applications pertains to local plans that 
classify pieces of land as “reserved areas” (emplacement réservé). 
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Reserved areas are slated for zoning for some future public use like a road, 
highway, public park, or some other form of infrastructure.  
As soon as a local plan is approved, the landowner of a reserved area 
has the right to ask the municipality to buy the land. The municipality then 
has the obligation to propose a purchase price within one year. If there is 
an agreement on the price, the municipality purchases the property without 
any problems. However, if the landowner and the municipality disagree on 
the proposed purchase price, the process is the same as in expropriation. 
The one caveat is that the purchase price must be set at the price the 
market would have assigned if the land had not been classified as 
“reserved.”  
In practice, this instrument has two positive benefits. First, it acts as a 
compensation measure in a situation where a landowner does not know 
how long it will take before expropriation occurs. Second, it deters 
municipalities from abusing the “reserved area” designation because it 
requires authorities to take into account the possible cost of compensating 
landowners. 
The same regulation applies where a plot of land is included in a 
municipality-created zone d’ aménagement concerté (“ZAC”). A ZAC is a 
type of planned unit development in which a municipality decides to 
delineate and develop an area of land. In addition, the municipality decides 
who will be the developer, whether public, private, or mixed. The decision 
to create a ZAC automatically grants municipalities the authority to 
expropriate the land if it is needed.  
Usually, a ZAC is created on an area that is already the property of the 
municipality or the future developer. However it is possible to have 
privately-owned land included in a ZAC. When this happens, private 
landowners come under the threat of an expropriation. There is no ceiling 
to the length of time when ZAC may apply and thereby freeze 
development rights. Given this situation, the mechanism of inverse 
condemnation becomes an important way of compensating landowners.  
Under specific circumstances, a similar mechanism applies to rural 
areas that have steep, mountainous topography. For example, when the 
national government delineates a national park so that it includes private 
land, the landowner may require the national governmental agency in 
charge of the national park to purchase the land. In order for this right to 
apply, the landowner must “have lost, as a result of zoning in the central 
area of a national park, more than fifty percent of the ‘total income from 
the land that he was [previously] obtaining.’” This is a specific instance of 
an application of a general principle in expropriation law, in which some 
additional compensation is due beyond the value of the parcel of land 
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directly expropriated, if the use of the expropriated part of the land 
negatively affects the ability to exploit a farm. Under the generic 
expression “réquisition d’ emprise totale,” in such a case, the landowner 
can require that the expropriating body buy not only the required land, but 
also the entire property.  
VI. SOME SPECIFIC COMPENSATION DEVICES 
As previously explained, the economic hardship attributed to the 
principle of non-compensation is to a large extent balanced by several 
devices concerning certain types of areas, such as mountain and coastal 
areas as well as certain types of servitudes, such as nuisance resulting from 
dangerous factories and electric power lines. 
A representative example is the compensation of a landowner whose 
property is classified as “protected wood or forest” (espace boisé classé).4 
It grants landowners compensation rights when their private lands are 
designated “protected wood or forest” areas. It should be noted that the 
regulations concerning woods and forests are quite old and strict and are 
subject to the general principle of protection, except under specific 
conditions. 
During the 1960s, there was strong pressure to develop the land 
surrounding major cities, especially those around the Paris Region. The 
political and social pressure to obtain some exceptions to the principle of 
total protection proved fruitful: some of the protected forest land was 
released for development.  
However, a backlash ensued. In 1967 Parliament passed legislation that 
strengthened the protection of wooden areas by introducing a new and 
even more restrictive category of “listed wood area.” At the same time, 
Parliament introduced a form of compensation that acted through an 
exchange mechanism: the landowner could ask a municipality to 
“declassify” up to ten percent of the protected area in exchange for giving 
the rest of the land to the municipality free of charge. The law then 
specified that the “betterment,” the additional value arising from the 
development rights granted to the ten percent area retained by the 
landowner, must not exceed the market value of the land given to the 
municipality. Alternatively, the municipality or any other level of 
government can grant the landowner a piece of municipal land to be 
 
 
 4. This is a special device that was introduced by the Land Use Law (Loi d’ orientation 
foncière) of December 31, 1967. 
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developed in exchange for the initial wooded area, subject to the same 
financial condition. 
This mechanism has not been used extensively, but it has helped to 
make the highly restrictive nature of the regulations concerning woods and 
forests more palpable to landowners. Some cases of declassification 
according to the ten percent rule have been the subject of disputes, 
particularly during the initial years of its application.  
Another example of compensation occurs when the French national 
electric corporation, Electricité de France, creates servitudes over lands 
that have high tension electric power lines hanging from above. A special 
agreement signed by Electricité de France and the Ministry of Ecology and 
Sustainable Development authorizes the company to compensate 
landowners who are injured by such power lines. This agreement has been 
so widely used in practice that a phenomenon has arisen where 
“compensation hunters,” landowners who are probably encouraged by 
lawyers, anticipate compensation opportunities and eagerly submit 
compensation claims. This behavior can be observed in other situations.  
A landowner also has compensation rights when land that surrounds a 
dangerous factory is classified as a dangerous zone. This compensation 
right is grounded in European Union legislation in 2003 and is called a 
“Seveso directive,” or a special servitude. In France, the Seveso directive 
has been applied as follows: an area surrounding the dangerous factory 
must be delineated, with a general prohibition of undertaking any 
development. The government authorities are obligated to compensate the 
landowners. In reality, rather than compensating landowners, the industrial 
corporations that run these factories usually prefer to buy the land from the 
landowners. The Seveso directive requires that the industrial corporation, 
the municipality, and the national government reach an agreement about 
the possibility of using expropriation or inverse condemnation. 
The same principle applies to protected perimeters around water 
catchments. In coastal areas, landowners may be required to guarantee a 
right of way to pedestrians along the coast. This type of servitude gives 
rise to a right of compensation. 
The general procedure is the same in all these cases: the governmental 
authority responsible for imposing the servitude draws up an agreement 
with the landowner. If there is disagreement, the two sides go to court and 
then follow the procedure used in cases of expropriation.  
As a whole, it appears that the restrictiveness of the principle of non-
compensation stated in article L 160-5 is balanced to a large extent by the 
emergence of specific compensation devices used for specific situations. 
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This process has been reinforced by the evolution of the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights, which we now turn to. 
VII. EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN UNION JURISPRUDENCE 
Since the mid-1990s, the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights with regards to compensation rights has evolved as the 
Court has applied the “right to the protection of property” (droit au respect 
des biens) found in the First Protocol of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.5 As a member state of the European Union, France must 
see to it that its domestic laws comply with the Convention and the 
Court’s interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Thus far, the general 
tendency of the European Court of Human Rights is to expand 
compensation rights.  
The French Supreme Administrative Court, the Conseil d’Etat, has 
held several times that the French principle of non-compensation is 
compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights. However, in 
the Bitouzet case,6 the French Supreme Administrative Court held that a 
new exception to the principle of non-compensation should be introduced 
in France. The Court proclaimed that compensation is due when a 
servitude results in a “special and extraordinary burden that is 
disproportionate to the public interest sought by the regulation” (“une 
charge spéciale et exorbitante, hors de proportion avec l’ intérêt general 
poursuivi”). The language of the decision indicates that that the Court 
wanted to avoid making a substantial modification to the principle of non-
compensation.  
Nevertheless, some lawyers argue that today there is a growing 
discrepancy between the French principle of non-compensation and the 
principle of property rights embedded in European Union law. However as 
this Article has shown, French practice and jurisprudence are gradually 
contributing to the reduction of this gap. 
 
 
 5. Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 6. Conseil d’Etat Section [CE Sect.] [highest administrative court section] July 3, 1998, 
Ministère de l’ Equipement c/ Bitouzet. 
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